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EAC is getting significantly more aggressive about CI.dll flag manipulation. If you think just flipping a bit and flipping it back is enough to sneak an unsigned driver past EOS, you're missing how they verify kernel integrity.
The DSE Restoration Problem
Using an arbitrary kernel write exploit to overwrite g_CiOptions is a standard entry point, but the "restoration" logic often fails against modern anti-cheats. Even if you restore the original surrounding structures and confirm DSE is active (by failing to load another unsigned driver), EasyAntiCheat can still flag the environment.
PreviousMode Manipulation and Detection
Writing PreviousMode to 0 on a memory reading thread is a classic bypass for user/kernel checks in syscalls like NtReadVirtualMemory. However, on EOS-protected processes, this is a high-risk move.
Has anyone else noticed EAC checking for thread PreviousMode consistency during active syscalls recently, or is it still mostly heartbeats? Drop your findings below.
The DSE Restoration Problem
Using an arbitrary kernel write exploit to overwrite g_CiOptions is a standard entry point, but the "restoration" logic often fails against modern anti-cheats. Even if you restore the original surrounding structures and confirm DSE is active (by failing to load another unsigned driver), EasyAntiCheat can still flag the environment.
- EAC likely caches the initial DSE state during boot or at the moment the service initializes. Any deviation from this cached value, even if reverted, can leave a persistent flag.
- Restoring the variable doesn't fix the internal kernel state tracking. There are various reporting structures like CiCheckSucceeded or other security-prefixed exports that EAC may be cross-referencing.
- Simply clearing the kernel debugging 0x2 bytes isn't a stealth fix; it's a known pattern that scanners look for.
PreviousMode Manipulation and Detection
Writing PreviousMode to 0 on a memory reading thread is a classic bypass for user/kernel checks in syscalls like NtReadVirtualMemory. However, on EOS-protected processes, this is a high-risk move.
- EAC iterates through system threads. Finding a thread with PreviousMode set to KernelMode (0) while it's executing logic related to a game process is an immediate red flag.
- The fact that it "worked once" suggests you might have slipped past a delayed check or a specific heartbeat interval, but it's not a reliable or undetected method for a long-term build.
- It's detectable via PsGetThreadContext or direct KTHREAD inspection from their own driver.
If you have a functioning kernel write bug, you're better off looking into manual mapping and properly cleaning the PiDDBCacheTable or KernelHashBucketList rather than touching g_CiOptions. Touching CI.dll variables is basically screaming for an integrity check failure these days.
Has anyone else noticed EAC checking for thread PreviousMode consistency during active syscalls recently, or is it still mostly heartbeats? Drop your findings below.
