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Anyone else looking into hypervisor detection lately? Been seeing way too many people treat VTX as the holy grail of security, thinking it makes them invisible to EAC or BattlEye. Spoiler: it doesn't.
Found this snippet floating around that highlights exactly why timing vectors are a nightmare for hypervisors. If your timing is off, you're flagged. Period.
Tech breakdown:
This implementation focuses on Intel VTX. The logic here uses specific time sources that are notoriously difficult to spoof, even from within a hypervisor environment.
Disclaimer: This is just a base to show that "hidden" hypervisors aren't as stealthy as the vendors claim. If you're running a DMA setup and relying on VTX to keep your system clean, you might want to rethink your threat model.
Boys, has anyone tried running this against some of the popular private hypervisor forks? Curious if any of the modern firmwares are actually padding the timing enough to pass a rigorous check like this, or if it's just a matter of time before the ACs start mass-detecting the overhead.
Drop your test results below if you compile this—especially if you've tried wrapping it in a driver to mitigate the DPC noise.
Found this snippet floating around that highlights exactly why timing vectors are a nightmare for hypervisors. If your timing is off, you're flagged. Period.
Tech breakdown:
This implementation focuses on Intel VTX. The logic here uses specific time sources that are notoriously difficult to spoof, even from within a hypervisor environment.
- The Timing Vector: It exploits the overhead inherent in hypervisor transitions. If you aren't accounting for the cycles spent during VM-exits, you're basically broadcasting your presence to any decent anti-cheat heartbeat.
- Intel vs. SVM: This specific code is for Intel VTX. If you're trying to sniff out SVM hypervisors, forget about doing it purely from ring 3. You need a kernel driver to hook the #UD handler because ring 3 transitions are just way too noisy and slow.
- Reliability issues: As it stands, this is a proof of concept. DPCs and OS-level interruptions will wreck your results. To make this production-ready against something like Vanguard or even standard BE, you'd need to move the logic into a kernel driver to ensure you aren't getting interrupted mid-measurement.
Code:
// Core timing concept logic snippet
// Focus on RDTSC delta comparisons
uint64_t start = __rdtscp(&aux);
// ... trigger suspected transition ...
uint64_t end = __rdtscp(&aux);
if ((end - start) > THRESHOLD) {
// Hypervisor detected
}
Disclaimer: This is just a base to show that "hidden" hypervisors aren't as stealthy as the vendors claim. If you're running a DMA setup and relying on VTX to keep your system clean, you might want to rethink your threat model.
Boys, has anyone tried running this against some of the popular private hypervisor forks? Curious if any of the modern firmwares are actually padding the timing enough to pass a rigorous check like this, or if it's just a matter of time before the ACs start mass-detecting the overhead.
Drop your test results below if you compile this—especially if you've tried wrapping it in a driver to mitigate the DPC noise.